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ABSTRACT. Interdisciplinary research in the fields of forestry and sustainability studies often encounters seemingly incompatible
ontological assumptions deriving from natural and social sciences. The perceived incompatibilities might emerge from the
epistemological and ontological claims of the theories or models directly employed in the interdisciplinary collaboration, or they might
be created by other epistemological and ontological assumptions that these interdisciplinary researchers find no reason to question.
In this paper we discuss the benefits and risks of two possible approaches, Popperian optimism and Kuhnian pessimism, to
interdisciplinary knowledge integration where epistemological and ontological differences between the sciences involved can be expected.
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INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes claimed that a central challenge for
interdisciplinary sciences, such as sustainability research and
forest science, which aim to integrate natural and social
dimensions, arises from the apparently incompatible ontological
and epistemological assumptions made by natural and social
scientists: “Differences in ontology and epistemology constitute
one of the main obstacles to the integration of knowledge across
scientific disciplines.” (Jerneck et al. 2011:78)  
The notion that ontological and epistemological differences are
a barrier to integration in sustainability science and forestry has
an initial plausibility. A contrast that comes to mind here is that
between strong and weak sustainability, a contrast some see as
one between distinct paradigms (e.g., Neumayer 2013). We believe
that, with careful scrutiny, this alleged barrier has the potential
to deepen our understanding of the interdisciplinary challenge.
In order to obtain this deeper understanding it is necessary, of
course, to isolate the supposed barrier and separate it from others.
For instance, the politics of science can pose serious problems for
interdisciplinarity independently of the epistemological and
ontological dimensions we are interested in here (e.g., Lenoir
1997). In what follows, we identify a fundamental type of
interdisciplinary decision problem, one that is epistemological
and ontological in nature. We begin by presenting possible, and
perhaps extreme, responses to the problem. These responses have
science-theoretic motivations and origins. After that, we examine
the extent to which the interdisciplinary decision problem might
highlight particular challenges in interdisciplinary forest science,
a strong research field in need of models that enable us to
understand the interdisciplinary challenges created by differing
ontologies and epistemologies.
THE POPPERIAN OPTIMIST AND THE KUHNIAN
PESSIMIST
The first standpoint is that of the optimist. Optimists may be
willing to agree that some collaborations are impeded by
ontological and/or epistemological differences between the two
or more sciences involved in the relevant interdisciplinary
investigation, but they will insist that such differences are
relatively superficial and possible to handle.  
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, Karl Popper is a prime example
of this kind of optimism. As far as we know, Popper did not pay
much attention to interdisciplinarity and its challenges; he
thought in more general terms. For this reason, we need to be
careful when labelling him an optimist. The Popperian position
is nicely illustrated by the following passage:  
Disciplines are distinguished partly for historical reasons
and reasons of administrative convenience (such as the
organisation of teaching and appointments), and partly
because the theories which we construct to solve our
problems have a tendency to grow into unified systems.
But all this classification and distinction is a
comparatively unimportant and superficial affair. We are
not students of some subject matter but students of
problems. And problems may cut right across the borders
of any subject matter or discipline. (Popper 1963:88) 
The Popperian optimist hardly discerns a difference between
interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity; all science proper is
inherently open to other disciplines. Scientific progress happens
in science as a whole and is not connected to particular disciplines
in anything but the most superficial way. The stakes are low,
comparatively speaking, because interdisciplinarity is strictly
speaking not a departure from the regular order. Disciplines can
perhaps hinder integration on this account, but only for practical
reasons, or, say, as a result of the epistemological and/or
ontological dogmatism of individual scientists.  
The second standpoint is the pessimist’s. Here it is useful to draw
on another familiar representative from the annals of the
philosophy of science, and someone who took a notoriously
contrarian view of Popper’s views: Thomas Kuhn. Again, as far
as we know Kuhn paid little attention to interdisciplinarity and
its challenges, so again we need to be cautious when we refer to
Kuhnian pessimism.  
Kuhn is known for his claim that mature sciences develop firm
disciplinary matrices that individual researchers cannot depart
from without losing their academic and scientific identity (Kuhn
1977, 1996). These matrices guide the researcher to problems and
their solutions. Being a researcher within a mature science involves
committing oneself  to, among other things, the ontological
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assumptions of the science in question. It would be very natural
for a Kuhnian to be a pessimist about the possibility of
overcoming ontological and epistemological differences between
two or more disciplines, and hence about the potential of
interdisciplinary research in which such differences might emerge.
It is important to note that the difficulty is not primarily social
or cultural, even if  the researcher and the research community
clearly run risks of ending up in a worse situation, after engaging
in interdisciplinary collaboration, than they were in before.
Fundamentally the epistemological and ontological risks are
those of disrupting the discipline or science itself. For Kuhn,
disciplines are not passive backdrops to scientific activity and
progress; they are the very vehicles in which progress is construed
and can take place. Those who seek to reach beyond disciplinary
boundaries, then, always help to ensure that there is a considerable
risk of undermining progress itself. At any rate, for the Kuhnian
pessimist the stakes are enormous in comparison.  
It seems to us that there may very well be an inverse relationship
between interdisciplinary potential and disciplinary differences
in ontology and epistemology. But it also seems plausible to
suppose that the exact nature of the relationship depends on
whether the optimist or the pessimist is right. If  the optimist is
right, interdisciplinary potential can survive quite a lot of
disciplinary difference. If  the pessimist is right, interdisciplinary
potential will quickly be destroyed by such disciplinary
differences.
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY DECISION PROBLEM
We shall now formulate what we will refer to as the
“interdisciplinary decision problem.” We will represent it as a
simple 2x2 matrix with two options and two states. We begin by
describing these options and states, and a few of the benefits and
risks associated with them.
Options
Anyone entering an interdisciplinary collaboration might do so
in a Kuhnian or a Popperian spirit: he or she might act as if  there
are fundamental barriers to interdisciplinary integration
(Kuhnian pessimism) or not bother about them because they are
superficial and can be handled (Popperian optimism).
States
Which strategy is successful and which is unnecessarily risky,
epistemologically and ontologically speaking, will depend on the
nature of the disciplines involved and the goods they deliver before
integration. The nature of one or both of the sciences, when it
comes to epistemology and ontology, might be such that
incompatibilities, if  they exist, are surface phenomena that would
never lead to problematic inconsistencies or ambiguity.
Alternatively they might be more Kuhnian, in which case (failure
to notice) the introduction of ontological and epistemological
inconsistencies might be extremely problematic.
Risks/benefits
Obviously, the Kuhnian approach will have merit if  the sciences
involved are Kuhnian in nature and are successful in what they
do, but that approach will give rise to a Popperian risk if  the
sciences are more accurately portrayed in the Popper passage
excerpted above (or if  they are not successful in what they
currently do). The risks and benefits will be unevenly distributed,
depending on which of the strategies is taken, if  one of the sciences
is Kuhnian and the other Popperian. The Popperian risk is that
we are not able to solve problems that cut right across the borders
of any subject matter or discipline. It is a missed opportunity.
Similarly, the Popperian approach is beneficial if  the sciences
involved have a Popperian nature anyway, but it gives rise to a
Kuhnian risk if  they are in fact more like the mature science with
disciplinary matrices that Kuhn writes about. The Kuhnian risk
is that a well-functioning disciplinary matrix is destroyed. We
think that the following remarks capture what is at stake in these
Kuhnian cases:  
The danger of interdisciplinarity, therefore, is to abandon
disciplines for a superficial fusing of incompatible
frameworks, repressing their elaborate structures that
have been created in a painstaking fashion by the
collaborative work of generations of scholars. (Burawoy
2013) 
Historical accuracy requires us to note that Kuhn wrote primarily
about natural sciences. However, Burawoy’s remarks suggest that
something very similar to disciplinary matrices, incompatible
frameworks with elaborate structure, and hence Kuhnian risks,
might exist in the social sciences as well (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. The interdisciplinary decision problem
The interdisciplinary decision problem builds on the familiar
distinction between Type I and Type II errors. For instance,
whereas in science it is important to avoid implying that there is
a causal link where there is none (Type I error), for a decision
maker it is often more important not to overlook a causal link
where there is one (Type II error; cf. Neyman and Pearson 1933).
In our case, the Kuhnian risk mimics Type I and the Popperian
risk mimics Type II. It makes sense to claim that within the
perspective of successful scientific disciplines it is more important
to minimize Type I error, i.e., to avoid Kuhnian risks, than it is to
minimize Type II error, i.e., to avoid Popperian risks. From the
point of view of interdisciplinary science, however, the reverse
might typically be true.  
The seriousness of Kuhnian and Popperian risks depends, in part,
on the risks and benefits associated with integration. It is quite
clear that in current science policy discourse integration is highly
incentivized, but even if  we look beyond integration for the sake
of attracting funds, as we must if  we want to find out anything
about epistemological and ontological consequences, there are
clearly substantive benefits to be secured through the successful
integration of disciplines (see, e.g., Nissani 1997).  
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The point to be made here is that the Kuhnian risk, even where
there is no disruption (and thus no complications in previously
well-functioning disciplines), is the risk of wasted effort. By
contrast, the risk connected with Popperian risk is that of wasted
opportunity. But then, depending on the precise types of
disciplinary difference and the nature of attempts to integrate the
disciplines, other things might be at stake as well. If  one counts
the reductive and imperialist project of sociobiology as a form of
integration, the consequences go far beyond wasted effort (see
Dupré 2003). Clarke and Walsh (2009) have argued that one risk
associated with imperialism is precisely that of the disruption of
an otherwise functioning paradigm resulting in so-called “Kuhn-
loss” where explanatory power of the displaced paradigm cannot
be recovered in the new paradigm. Kuhnian risks thus deserve to
be taken seriously.  
However, sometimes the disciplines are not very successful in the
tasks we want to assign to them. When this happens the perceived
negative impact of introducing inconsistencies among the
ontological assumptions, as well as other elements that might
hamper a well-functioning discipline or science, is not necessarily
catastrophic, especially if  the resulting framework becomes more
powerful in delivering desired outcomes. So, we have to assume
that the current state of the art (the state, that is, before integration
is attempted) is satisfactory, or promising, so far as the prospect
of the Kuhnian risk balancing or outweighing the Popperian risk
is concerned. For instance, currently the best way of preparing
long-term climate projections uses so-called multimodel ensemble
forecasting. Successive projects have sought to integrate current
climate models. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report relied on the Climate Model
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5). The most recent
iteration is CMIP6. The approach is interesting in the present
context because the models that are included in this project are
not complementary: they do not represent different parts of the
climate system. Instead each is a model of the complete climate
system. The results that emerge from them are aggregated to
produce a single projection. Clearly, there is an ontological issue
and a potential Kuhnian risk here. The models make substantively
different assumptions about the way the climate system works.
And it is not clear that it is possible to integrate them without
unearthing ontological inconsistencies. This, however, is not
conceived as a barrier to integration; nor is it conceived as a
substantial risk in the short run. The ensemble output fits better
with available climate data than the outputs of any of the models
taken by themselves (Parker 2006). In other words, Kuhnian risks
are not on the agenda. This might be because what the IPCC does
has no impact on the further development of these models; or it
might be because none of the models is thought to harbor the
seeds of a new discipline or well-functioning disciplinary matrix.  
The benefits of integration are usually cast in epistemic terms.
They include things like solving particularly difficult or pressing
problems, the promotion of innovation, and a better
understanding of the world in general. Better understanding of
the ways in which different bodies of scientific knowledge relate
to one another, epistemic security, and the unification of science
are also among the payoffs that have been mentioned (Sherif  and
Sherif  1969, Klein 1990, Nissani 1997, Hansson 1999, Thorén
and Persson 2013).  
A risk one runs when one does not attempt integration is that
important insights will be delayed, in the worst-case scenario,
indefinitely. So we might put ourselves in an epistemic situation
that is objectively worse than what it could have been. Popperian
risks are therefore also very important. Hence the
interdisciplinary decision problem is not an easy one to address.
THREE EXAMPLES FROM FORESTRY
The silviculturist/economist and the ecologist in forestry
“Forestry was born out of necessity,” the Ministry of Forests,
Lands and Natural Resource Operations of British Columbia
states in their recent workbook for students and practitioners of
silviculture (Introduction to Silvicultural Systems, https://www.
for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/training/00014/index.htm). Similar claims have
been made about the birth of forest science itself: “There would
be ... no forest science without deficiency in wood supplies. This
science is only a child of necessity or need” (Cotta 1816, as cited
in Puettmann et al. 2009:1).  
Reality is of course more complex. Different interests and
research areas relevant to forests and forestry have competed with
and complemented each other for a long time (for a Swedish
perspective, see, e.g., Hagner 2005).  
Here we will follow Puettmann and his colleagues (2009) in
exploring the more instrumental, industrial, and economical,
need for forest science. Growing populations and unregulated
exploitation of natural stands of trees in Europe led to severe
timber shortages. As early as in 1503 an Act of Parliament
referring to the situation in England stated that the forests of the
country had been “utterly destroyed” (Holmes 1975). In Norway
the total mass volume of timber in forested areas decreased for
three centuries between 1600 and 1900 (Aasetre and Bele 2009).
Foresters in Europe started to manage stands of trees, and
eventually this led to the science of forestry and its interest in
silvicultural systems, i.e., planned programs of management
during the whole life of a stand designed to achieve specific
structural objectives.  
With the advent of economic liberalism in the 19th century the
idea that the purpose of silviculture was to sustainably maximize
profit for landowners became influential. Economical rather than
site-level ecological thinking influenced planning through
concepts such as that of the normal forest and the Faustmann
formula. Central to both concepts were forest management
approaches in which forests were divided into similar-sized
management units, or simply stands (Puettmann et al. 2009).
Stands are defined as groups of trees that foresters can effectively
manage as a unit (Nyland 2002). More than any other concept in
silviculture, the concept of a stand has since been accepted as a
basis, or component, of decision making.  
The stand concept can be fed into formal methods used to
calculate the value of forestland and assess economically optimal
rotation ages. Broadly speaking, it belongs to economics and fits
with the kind of ontology developed there.  
All of these concepts were used as more than instruments for
calculation: they influenced forest management as well. For
instance, in the management approaches that often followed from
the application of the concepts ideal stands were seen as (1)
homogeneous in species mixtures, or monocultures, (2)
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homogenous in size and site conditions, (3) fully stocked, or with
homogenous stocking, (4) of homogenous wood quality, (5)
organized spatially to facilitate harvesting, and (6) without risks
of natural damage and catastrophes (Puettmann et al. 2009). To
a degree the concepts changed our forests. However, with a few
exceptions silvicultural research plots have been found to be much
more uniform than the stands to which the results were expected
to apply (Puettmann et al. 2009).  
This reminds us of a difference in ontological attitude that is often
to be found between students of ecology and students of
economics. The ontological claims of working ecologists are often
realist: they assume the traditional (Aristotelean) position that
theories disclose the world. Students of economics, however, are
not afraid to rely on idealization. Silviculturists have sometimes
turned idealizations into realities through their management
approaches.  
Of course, other concepts have at times been very important. For
instance, the concept of timber has clearly been central in forestry.
“Timber” was the fourth most common word in Journal of
Forestry in the period 1902–1912, behind “forest,” “trees,” and
“feet” (Mårald et al. 2016). The concept of timber is not unrelated
to that of a stand. If  we consider stumpage (the price a private
firm pays for the right to harvest timber from a stand), the land
expectation value (LEV) is, according to the Faustmann Formula,
a function of stumpage price, stand volume, regeneration cost,
and interest rate.  
There was also early opposition to the idea that the stand concept
offered a sound basis for forest management. It was complained,
for instance, that the sizes of stands are not based on ecological
considerations (see G. H. Mayr, as portrayed in Puettmann et al.
2009).  
Perhaps the inclusion of stands would not introduce
contradictions in the ontology ecologists assume, but it is far from
being a natural component of the ecologist’s ontology. Built into
forestry, then, from early on were differences between the
conceptual tools of silviculture and ecology that might prove
difficult to overcome in interdisciplinary collaboration. Klaus
Puettmann and colleagues (2009: x) claim that the discipline of
silviculture is at a crossroads: “It is very apparent to us that
silviculture - and more broadly, forest management - now needs
to go through unprecedented changes.” This is a clear example of
an interdisciplinary field where differences in ontology are
brought to the fore, and in their provocative book, Puettmann
and colleagues claim that those differences force us to take an
interdisciplinary decision of the type we have portrayed in Figure
1. To the extent that we agree with this view, the disciplinary
difference between silviculture, with its robust background in
economic theory, on the one hand, and ecology, on the other, does
seem, potentially, to force the interdisciplinary decision problem
on the science of forestry. What is clear to all of us, whether we
agree with the Puettmannian analysis or not, is that stand, and
related concepts such as site potential, are ontological items in
silviculture that clearly do not exist in ecology; and that selection
is an ontological item in ecology that does not exist in silviculture.
It might be difficult to integrate the two frameworks, even if  it is
suspected that silviculture has fewer problems in that respect than
ecology has.  
The question, then, is whether these ontological differences are
enough to differentiate between the expected consequences of the
Popperian and the Kuhnian approaches to this interdisciplinary
decision problem in forest science. Silviculture is perhaps not the
kind of discipline or set of activities allowing questions about
ontology or epistemology to be easily settled. However, it has no
firm disciplinary matrix à la Kuhn. As far as silviculture is
concerned, there is arguably no catastrophic Kuhnian risk in sight
if  we approach interdisciplinary collaboration with Popperian
optimism. The Kuhnian risk still exists, but more one-sidedly, for
ecologists. Hence, with hindsight, the interdisciplinary decision
problem has one preferable solution for silviculturists, but another
for ecologists:  
1. For silviculturists, it is not rational to act on the assumption
that the state “Incompatible epistemologies and ontologies”
obtains. Hence there is only one relevant state to consider,
namely that the epistemologies and ontologies are
compatible. In light of this, Kuhnian pessimism is not
warranted; and it has the negative consequence, runs the
Popperian risk, of putting us in a position where we cannot
solve cross-cutting problems. 
2. For ecologists, it is rational to act on the assumption that
the state “Incompatible epistemologies and ontologies”
obtains. The Kuhnian risk of destroying a well-functioning
discipline therefore needs to be considered. Moreover, it has
to be weighed against the Popperian risk that we will be
unable to solve cross-cutting problems. The preferred way
of managing the latter is, of course, to export the problem
(as well as the necessary ontological and methodological
assumptions to solve it) to forest science. 
From both perspectives, the differences could nevertheless be
epistemically fundamental because they might affect what
students of these topics see when they walk in an old forest:  
The old natural forest may have aesthetic appeal to
silviculturists, but they do not consider it desirable or
productive. It is viewed as an underachiever. [...]
Silviculturists typically focus on commercial tree species
and whether they are growing up to site potential. They
use log and timber grading criteria as a basis to categorize
individual trees as being “good” or “bad.” (Puettmann
et al. 2009:89) 
For an ecologist, the same forest is the culmination of
hundreds, thousands, or even millions (in the tropics) of
years of evolution, adaptation, competition, selection,
disturbance, and change. Ecologists marvel at the
structural, compositional, and dynamic variability of the
forest. (Puettmann et al. 2009:89)
Forest islands
In parts of West Africa a particular type of landscape can be
found in the transition zone between the forests of the south and
the savanna of the north: a forest savanna mosaic. One place
where this mixture of vegetation dominates is the Kissidougou
prefecture in Guinea. James Fairhead and Melissa Leach (1996)
describe it as follows:  
Kissidougou’s landscape is striking. Over open expanses
of grassy savanna tower patches of dense, verdant, semi-
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deciduous rainforest. These forest islands, scattered over
the gently rolling hills, are generally circular, perhaps a
kilometre or two in diameter, and most conceal at their
centre one of the prefecture’s 800 or so villages. (Fairhead
and Leach 1996:1) 
Western observers of the region, historically, those associated
with the colonial administration, but later those also of scientists
and researchers, have tended to assume that the scattered patches
of forest are remnants of a once great forest that is being degraded
by the (mal-)practices of the indigenous inhabitants of
aforementioned villages. The changes, or rather, the apparent
changes, were assumed to be “recent, ongoing, unilineal, and
essentially anthropogenic in origin” (Fairhead and Leach
1996:53). Such a view would be consistent with the depiction of
the European situation presented in the previous section, which
assumes that “forestry was born out of necessity.”  
Fairhead and Leach challenge this perception. They suggest that
to the extent that it is useful to enter into such speculation, the
natural state of this landscape is not a forest, but a savanna.
Interestingly, forest islands often contain, or have at some point
in history contained, a settlement of some sort (Fairhead and
Leach 1996).  
Villagers promote the development of forest islands more or less
deliberately in the course of everyday life, occasionally by planting
trees, but more often simply by creating fire and soil conditions
that favor forest regeneration in savanna. The processes involved
can be observed today in the vicinity of recently established
settlements (Fairhead and Leach 1996). Supporting Fairhead and
Leach, recent studies based on very high resolution remote
sensing have reported observations in the Sahel indicating that
“villagers safeguard trees on nearby farmlands which contradicts
simplistic ideas of a high negative correlation between population
density and woody cover” (Brandt et al. 2018:1).  
Trees in forest islands are used for timber and protection and can
sometimes be seen in the remnants of garden fences that have
been left to decay. Where settlements have been abandoned, the
forest will often be replaced by savanna. Strikingly, historical
records, including aerial photography from 1952 onward and
written accounts that go back another 50 or so years, suggest that
the landscape of forest islands has not changed much since the
first westerners commented on its character.  
The shift in perspective is significant for several reasons. The
assumption that land degradation is a problem in the region has
sometimes led the authorities to punish the (common) use of fire
with the death penalty (Fairhead and Leach 1996). It has also
aggravated the problem of deforestation. The resulting historical
errors about whether, where, and when deforestation has occurred
have led to inaccurate accounts of its causes (Fairhead and Leach
1998).  
This is a matter of interdisciplinary integration in the following
sense: Fairhead and Leach bring knowledge and evidence sourced
from different disciplines, anthropology of course, but also
historical records, to bear on a particular question, one that
previously seemed to be within the purview of forest ecologists.
In the light of the application of this integrative perspective on
this particular ecosystem (and in effect all ecosystems) ecology as
such appears to be threatened.  
The example illustrates three points. First, it shows the potential
benefits of integration and the impact that it can have on practice
down the line. In doing this it illustrates the potential benefits of
a Popperian approach to interdisciplinary science. Second, in their
approach Fairhead and Leach appear to act as Popperian
optimists: they identify several ontological and epistemological
differences between natural and social science, and more
specifically between anthropology and ecology, but nonetheless
proceed to revise conclusions they associate with ecology. This
fits well with the idea that they have tackled the interdisciplinary
decision problem as Popperian optimists.  
The question is whether this version of Popperian optimism has
to face the Kuhnian risk. The answer is not entirely clear. As with
the previous example, it appears that the Kuhnian risk of
disrupting disciplines that are (with the proviso that this is clearly
a matter of some contention) functioning is not necessarily borne
equally by the parties involved. The discipline most challenged
here is ecology, and the effect of the integrative project in the long
run is to make ecology a discipline that is in many respects
dependent on a range of social and human science disciplines.
Fairhead and Leach do explicitly challenge what can be seen as
foundational concepts for ecologists, concepts such as nature.
And if  this challenge is taken seriously, it has far reaching
implications for ecology as a discipline. This consequence would
be the materialization of the Kuhnian risk, given that the science
was functioning well to begin with.
Agroforestry
Potentially, the interdisciplinary decision problem can also arise
between, on the one hand, science and expert communities, and
on the other, locals or stakeholders. Anne Jerneck and Lennart
Olsson (2013) discuss the slow adoption of agroforestry by sub-
Saharan farmers. They claim that “the ontology of global policies
focussing on the merits of agroforestry differs from the ontology
of everyday practices and strategies in subsistence agriculture”
(Jerneck and Olsson 2013:114). Interestingly, they identify this as
a major constraint on the take-up of agroforestry.  
Projects launched by development and agroforestry agencies rely
on multiple, multiscalar, and long-term views of trees while
peasant farmers have multiple yet mainly single-scalar and short-
term views. Experts have a wide perspective locating trees into
global-regional-local agro-ecosystems of land management and
soil erosion prevention while relating it to poverty-reduction.
They stress the intangible benefits from trees such as biodiversity
and carbon sequestration indicating the potential of a global
public good. In contrast, peasant farmers view trees as local
communal or private goods with mainly tangible and immediate
services while also carrying intangible symbolic values over
generations. To exemplify, Clarence, an old farmer in Kalacha,
Kenya defended the cultural value of an old tree threatened by
road constructions near his village. To complain, he sent a letter
to Jomo Kenyatta, the President at the time. Meanwhile, he
persuaded the driver of the bulldozer to save the tree. To this day
the tree is still there. It is used for village meetings and keeps its
material and symbolic value (Jerneck and Olsson 2013).  
Experts and farmers enter into collaboration with different aims
and priorities and, at least, to some extent, differing ontologies.
These differences lead to problems, Jerneck and Olsson argue, in
this case, to difficulties in implementing agroforestry with Kenyan
locals who are primarily subsistence farmers.  
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Where does this leave us with the disciplinary decision problem,
as we have described it above? To begin with, it becomes somewhat
less clear that the problem here is one of interdisciplinary
integration strictly speaking. It is an ontological barrier, yes, but
that barrier is not between disciplines. It is rather between science,
or the science-based knowledge of expert communities, and the
practical experience or everyday life-worlds of local farmers.
Would it be more correct to speak of interdisciplinary
integration’s intellectual cousin, the transdisciplinary decision
problem? There is certainly a strong resemblance to the
interdisciplinary decision problem. The practical experience of
the farmers harbors ontological ideas and ways of reliably
collecting evidence, etc., and these ontological and
methodological ideas are in conflict with science. In other words,
the interdisciplinary decision problem is not necessarily a problem
that presupposes two disciplines. Versions of it might appear as
soon as we have two items of somewhat structured and
systematically acquired knowledge. This way of looking at the
problem would be alien to Kuhn, but not to Popper, who thought
that science could have its origin in myth and whatnot.  
In other words, in this example the scientists and policy makers
seeking to embed desirable practices (agroforestry) among
individuals and groups (subsistence farmers) are acting like
Popperian optimists. In acting in this way, they either fail to
acknowledge the existence of important differences (in
perspectives and ontologies) or underestimate their potency. This
failure to grasp the ontological and epistemological nuances of
the situation explains, at least partly, the difficulties in
implementing the practices. Kuhnian pessimism is warranted.
There is probably no way to integrate the two knowledge systems
in their entirety. Integration presupposes change within the
systems to begin with. The expert community needs to harness
local knowledge. Practical knowledge systems need tailoring, so
that they do not contradict fundamental scientific assumptions.
Both might be too demanding to be applied in any specific
transdisciplinary encounter, and that is why pessimism is
warranted. Over time, however, both processes are essential
components of education and science.
TWO REQUIREMENTS ON THE SCRUTINY OF
POTENTIAL KUHNIAN RISKS
We want to emphasize that we fully acknowledge the importance
of Kuhnian risks. If  scientific progress is to be made over the long
term it is important to avoid ontological and epistemological
inconsistencies, and a good disciplinary matrix, if  one has one,
should not be abandoned unless a better alternative is in place.
This position, which is familiar and is often advocated in the
literature on research programs (Lakatos 1976), is arguably even
more attractive when interdisciplinary collaboration is at stake.
Those who are active in mature and successful disciplines are
typically involved in several interdisciplinary collaborations; they
pursue core research in their own fields in addition. It would be
strange if  failure to solve a problem outside the domain of primary
interest in the discipline led to the abandonment of a good
disciplinary matrix. It would be more rational, always allowing
that whether science ever is rational in this sense is an interesting
question, if  in such a case the discipline withdrew from the
interdisciplinary collaboration and let other disciplines integrate
useful elements from it.  
Having said that, and without compromising the insight in any
way, we want also to emphasize two things. First, certain
disciplinary differences, e.g., of the ontological kind, are harmless
in the sense that integrating them does not entail inconsistency
and leads only to a wider ontological basis. The difference here is
readily explained by reconsidering the evolutionary ladder of
interdisciplinarity in Jantsch (1972), as adapted in Thorén and
Persson (2013; Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. (Part of) Jantsch’s (1972) evolutionary ladder of
interdisciplinarity, adapted from Thorén and Persson (2013).
Jantsch’s ladder of multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, and
transdisciplinarity might also be taken, in our view, to describe a
state within a single discipline. Some disciplines seem to consist
of rather independent components; others are coordinated in
every aspect. To be sure, that variation is exactly what we would
expect to see in Popper’s view. It may be that in order to have a
disciplinary matrix à la Kuhn the relation between the
components of the discipline should be more like the ladder rung
referred to by Jantsch as transdisciplinarity, although we would
not wish to press that point here. Our point is simply that a
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widened basis could be similar to the first rung,
multidisciplinarity, and this would not entail inconsistency. As a
matter of fact, the comparison might be useful in explaining that
certain ontological differences, and other disciplinary differences,
pose no problems of interdisciplinary integration. It may also help
us to see that integration, somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes
entails a transition from a higher rung on the interdisciplinary
ladder to a lower, and similarly, within single disciplines. Now,
there are reasons why it is sometimes important to work with a
small set of ontological building blocks rather than a huge
number, but the Kuhnian risk (as we perceive of it) does not
explain why that is so. It also appears to us that some of the
examples we have discussed here do not give rise to the
interdisciplinary decision problem, for exactly this reason.  
Second, Kuhnian risk is realized only where interdisciplinary
collaboration leads to changes in the ontologies or epistemologies
of the disciplines, i.e., where the disciplinary matrices of the
disciplines are changed, or even worse, become inconsistent.
However, interdisciplinary collaboration can be pursued without
this happening. In Thorén and Persson (2013), for instance, it is
argued that a powerful way of collaborating in an interdisciplinary
way is through problem-feeding. Problem-feeding is a form of
interdisciplinary exchange in which the central object of exchange
is a problem, or set of problems, rather than, say, a concept, model,
or theory. The basic idea is that problems occasionally arise within
disciplines in which they cannot be solved easily (see also Sherif
and Sherif  1969, Darden and Maull 1977, Maull 1977, Darden
1991). For example, recognition of the seriousness of climate
change, which was for a long time the domain of the natural
sciences exclusively, has produced a wealth of problems that fall
immediately within the purview of the social sciences. How can,
and how should, we adapt to climate change? What is the best
balance between mitigation and adaptation? What are the limits
of adaptation? What are the social drivers of climate change? And
so on. As Thorén (2015) has pointed out, problem-feeding may
serve to protect the disciplinary matrix by, essentially, exporting
an otherwise burdensome anomaly. This involves constraining the
domain of the “exporting” discipline, to a degree anyway, but it
goes to show that interdisciplinary interaction sometimes serves
to reduce intra-disciplinary inconsistencies (perhaps at the
expense of leaving interdisciplinary ones).
RISK AND IMPERIALISM
That there are risks involved in engaging in interdisciplinarity is
well-recognized in the literature, although the emphasis is often
on professional risks to researchers who engage in research
beyond the mainstream of their disciplines, or on the more general
uncertainty of outcomes. We have highlighted potentially more
substantive risks to the structure of individual disciplines,
especially in the form of what we have labeled Kuhnian risks: risks
threatening the disruption of a functioning and progressive
disciplinary matrix. Typically, Kuhnian risks arise when a
discipline either expands into a new domain or incorporates
elements from an expanding (other) discipline. They are often the
result of imperialism of one form or another (e.g., Dupré 2003,
Clarke and Walsh 2009). Recently, the imperialistic tendency of
resilience thinking has sometimes led to Kuhnian risks in forestry
(e.g., Newton 2016) and sustainability studies (e.g., Olsson et al.
2015). Newton, who is an ecologist, identifies three risks for the
conservation of biodiversity in forest ecosystems when resilience
is adopted as a policy goal: ambiguity, measurement problems,
and misuse of the term.  
So, the interdisciplinary decision problem can be seen as a risk
management problem. As has been pointed out in connection
with some of the examples, and focusing on the disciplines
involved, as opposed to the practices that eventually follow, risks
and benefits are not always equally distributed among
collaborators or, more broadly, involved parties. In Puettmann et
al.’s (2009) silviculture case and Fairhead and Leach’s (1996) study
of forest islands it is the autonomy of ecology as a discipline, and
not, say, anthropology or the science or forestry, that faces the
primary threat.  
Hermansson and Hansson (2007) suggest that in managing
decisions that involve risk we need to address important ethical
considerations: who is the decision maker, who is exposed to the
risk, and who stands to benefit from taking the risk? In certain
constellations this becomes especially clear, e.g., when the decision
maker and the beneficiary are one and the same individual but
the person or group exposed to the risk is someone else. We do
not wish to overstrain the analogy, but we note that certain
instances of supposed interdisciplinary integration, such as
Wilson’s (1975) sociobiology, conform, at least superficially, to
this pattern. As Mary Midgley (1984) once complained,
sociobiology sought to expand the domain of the biological
sciences at the expense of the social and behavioral sciences. As
a result, the Kuhnian risks were not carried by those who sought
integration (and to whom the benefits were most obvious).  
But there are limits to this analogy in this context. Clearly
disciplines conceived of as research programs can fail, and
disciplines do not have exclusive ownership of the domains with
which they are associated. Nonetheless, we suspect that keeping
an eye on the interdisciplinary decision problem, and on who is
bearing the Kuhnian risks in interdisciplinary integration and
collaboration, is important, not least when the former is supposed
to involve the latter.
CONCLUSION: THE INTERDISCIPLINARY DECISION
PROBLEM
We formulate, perhaps for the first time, a characteristic decision
problem that occurs in interdisciplinary settings, and probably in
transdisciplinary settings as well: the interdisciplinary decision
problem. In order to see it clearly, one has to shield it off  from
the many, and in the short run more powerful, problems
interdisciplinary science encounters. But there is no doubt, we
have argued, that the interdisciplinary decision problem is real,
and we conjecture that in the long run it is extremely important
for scientific progress. In this sense, there is a normative side to
the interdisciplinary decision problem. It ought to be taken
seriously, and if  sustainable scientific progress is to be made, it
needs to be taken into account even though, or perhaps precisely
because, it is generally overshadowed by the more obvious
political, social, and cultural barriers to interdisciplinary science.
To be more than a theoretical possibility, the interdisciplinary
decision problem—the balancing act between Popperian
optimism and Kuhnian pessimism—might of course require
something from the politics of science: a certain openness, and
perhaps even the kind of open society for which Popper argued.
If  the interdisciplinary decision problem is to become a real
decision problem, and if  long-term progress in interdisciplinary
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science is to be a genuine possibility, we may need to avoid being
too disciplined by disciplines: interdisciplinary science may not
“flourish if  science becomes the exclusive possession of a closed
set of specialists” (Popper 1995:110).  
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